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INTRODUCTION 
Trademark law in the United States involves “recognizing an intellectual 
property [right,] created and acquired by use.  Government registration in the 
[United States] is essentially recognition of a right already acquired by use . . . .  
[R]egistration in the [United States] does not create the trademark.”1  Therefore, 
“[u]se of a designation as a trademark in the marketplace does two things: (1) 
 
*J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, Marquette University Law School.  
1. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
19:1.75 (5th ed. 2019); see also JBLU, Inc. v. United States, 813 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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it creates common law rights under state law; and (2) under federal law, it 
creates a basis for federal registration.”2  Converse and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “Federal Circuit”) put this principle of 
trademark law to the test in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.3  
The Federal Circuit devotes two sentences,4 and includes four citations to other 
sources of authority,5 to whether there is a distinction between an unregistered, 
common-law trademark (“common-law trademark”) and a federally registered 
trademark (“federal trademark”).6  However, this brief discussion serves as the 
jumping-off point for the rest of the Federal Circuit’s opinion. 
This Comment analyzes which trademark model (the pyramid model or the 
box model) is a better representation and characterization of trademarks and 
trademark rights.  Under the pyramid model, there is one trademark: both 
common law rights and federal registration rights attach to this single 
trademark.  For the pyramid model, trademark rights resemble a pyramid 
because federal registration rights build upon the foundation created by 
common law rights.  Common law rights and federal registration rights are 
interdependent.  Under the box model, there is a common-law trademark and a 
federal trademark: common law rights attach to the common-law trademark, 
and federal registration rights attach to the federal trademark.  For the box 
model, trademark rights resemble two separate boxes because the first box 
contains common law rights, and the second box contains federal registration 
rights.  Common law rights are independent of federal registration rights. 
In Part I, this Comment provides a brief overview of trademark law and 
explains the basic principles of trademark law in the context of the pyramid 
model and the box model.  Part II explains the procedural history of Converse, 
Inc. v. International Trade Commission before the International Trade 
Commission (the “ITC”).  Part II also outlines the Federal Circuit opinion for 
Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.  In Part III, this Comment 
summarizes an earlier Federal Circuit opinion and an earlier Supreme Court 
opinion, focusing on which trademark model was applied in each case.  Part IV 
 
2. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:8. 
3. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
4. Id. at 1115.  “In addressing these issues, we think that it is confusing and inaccurate to refer 
to two separate [trade]marks—a [federal] [trade]mark and a common-law [trade]mark.  Rather, there 
is a single [trade]mark, as to which different rights attach from the common law and from federal 
registration.”  Id. 
5. Id. at 1115–16.  The four sources cited include case law and the leading treatise on 
trademarks: (1) In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999); (2) In re Deister 
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961); (3) 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:3 (5th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2018); and (4) Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).  Id. 
6. See id. at 1115. 
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discusses whether the Federal Circuit correctly applied its chosen trademark 
model.  Finally, this Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit, in Converse, 
Inc v. International Trade Commission, got it right; trademarks should be 
viewed in the context of the pyramid model. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARKS: PYRAMID OF RIGHTS VS. BOXES OF 
RIGHTS 
The two different trademark models—the pyramid model and the box 
model—demonstrate a conflict in trademark law: how should trademarks and 
trademark rights be represented and characterized?  The pyramid model 
recognizes the existence of only one trademark and views the rights conferred 
by trademark law as a pyramid with two levels.  Although there is a single main 
trademark, the two levels of the pyramid represent sub-trademarks.  Level 1 
represents the common-law trademark portion of the trademark—which, in 
other words, is the trademark with common law rights attached.  Level 1 
consists of common law rights.  If applicable, Level 2 represents the federal 
trademark portion of the trademark—which, in other words, is the trademark 
with federal registration rights attached.  Level 2 contains federal registration 
rights.  Level 1 and Level 2 build upon one another.  Under the pyramid model, 
a trademark owner has two options: (1) a trademark owner can have only Level 
1; or (2) a trademark owner can have both Level 1 and Level 2.  Level 1 can 
exist without Level 2, but Level 2 cannot exist without Level 1.   
The box model recognizes the existence of two separate trademarks (a 
common-law trademark and a federal trademark) and views the rights conferred 
by trademark law as two separate boxes.  Box 1 contains the common-law 
trademark and common law rights, and Box 2 contains the federal trademark 
and federal registration rights.  Box 1 and Box 2 are independent of one another.  
Under the box model, a trademark owner has three options: (1) a trademark 
owner can have both Box 1 and Box 2; (2) a trademark owner can have only 
Box 1; or (3) a trademark owner can have only Box 2.   
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Below are basic diagrams of the two trademark models: 
 
 
 
The same principles of trademark law support both the pyramid model and 
the box model, but the interpretation of those principles highlights the 
differences between the two trademark models.  First, the trademark in the 
pyramid model and the trademarks in the box model are established in the same 
way, and both trademark models include the same fundamental right afforded 
to trademark owners.  The criteria for establishing a trademark right is not 
complex: the trademark must be “use[d] in commerce.”7  Therefore, as the 
Supreme Court has observed, the rule for establishing trademark ownership is 
use, not federal registration.8  Moreover, contingent on the ability to 
demonstrate validity, a trademark owner has “the right to prevent others from 
trading on the goodwill established by the trademark by using the same or a 
similar trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the source, 
 
7. See Jonathan Hyman et al., If the IP Fits, Wear It: IP Protection for Footwear–A U.S. 
Perspective, 108 TMR 645, 659 (2018). 
8. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3. 
Box 1 
Common-
Law 
Trademark 
Box 2 
Federal 
Trademark 
Level 2 
Federal 
Trademark 
Level 1 
Common-Law Trademark 
Single 
Trademark 
Figure 1: Pyramid Model Figure 2: Box Model 
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origin, or sponsorship of products.”9  Use in commerce establishes Level 1 of 
the pyramid model and Box 1 and Box 2 of the box model, and both levels of 
the pyramid model and boxes of the box model support the right outlined above; 
however, that is where the similarities between the two trademark models end.  
The differences between the pyramid model and the box model become 
apparent through other principles of trademark law. 
The pyramid model and the box model support the relationship between 
common-law trademarks and federal trademarks in different ways.  Trademark 
rights acquired from federal registration “may be considered supplemental to 
those recognized at common law, stemming from ownership of a trademark.”10  
Federal registration does not eliminate common law rights.11  “When a 
trademark is registered, common law rights continue: they are not erased by 
federal registration.”12  The pyramid model views federal registration as 
building upon common law rights, adding another level to the pyramid.  The 
box model views federal registration as adding another box that sits next to the 
common law box.  In addition, federal registration “provides significant 
benefits and can make enforcement of the [trade]mark easier.”13  The scope of 
protection for common-law trademarks is limited: 
 
Without registration, trademark rights under the [United States] 
common law system may be limited only to those geographic areas 
where the [trade]mark is used.  Additionally, when relying only on 
common law rights, the trademark owner must prove that the 
[trade]mark is valid and protectable in order to prevail in a claim of 
trademark infringement.14 
 
In comparison, the scope of protection for federal trademarks is broader: 
 
A federal[] . . . [trade]mark is presumed to be a valid [trade]mark and 
the registrant is presumed to have the exclusive right to use the 
trademark throughout the United States on the goods or services listed 
in the registration.  Additionally, a registration constitutes constructive 
notice to third parties of the registrant’s rights in the [trade]mark, is 
readily revealed in trademark clearance searches conducted by others, 
 
9. Hyman et al., supra note 7, at 659. 
10. In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (1970). 
11. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3. 
12. Id. 
13. Hyman et al., supra note 7, at 659. 
14. Id. 
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can block confusingly similar [trade]marks from registering, and can 
also be registered with Customs to help block the importation of 
counterfeit goods.  After five years, the registration may become 
incontestable, which significantly limits the grounds on which 
competitors can attack the registration.15 
 
From the pyramid model perspective, the significant benefits of federal 
registration add to the minimal benefits conferred by common law.  From the 
box model perspective, the significant benefits of federal registration are 
separate from the minimal benefits conferred by common law. 
Furthermore, the sources of trademark law can be interpreted to either 
support the pyramid model or the box model.  “Federal registration and state 
common law rights emanate from separate government sources.”16  For 
example, in terms of federal law, trademarks in the United States are primarily 
governed by the Lanham Act.17  For the pyramid model, the separate sources 
of law represent the two levels of the pyramid; the separate sources of law still 
need to cooperate for the trademark system to function.  In comparison, for the 
box model, because multiple sources govern trademark law, it requires two 
separate boxes; different sources of law mean different governing statutes, 
different rights, and different remedies. 
Finally, the ability to bring civil actions and the associated remedies 
provided for under trademark law can be interpreted to either support the 
pyramid model or the box model.  A trademark owner can bring a civil action 
under either state law or federal law.18  For trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act, the trademark owner can rely on 15 U.S.C. § 1114 for a federal 
trademark or 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for a common-law trademark.19  A trademark 
owner’s ability to bring a civil action under federal law is not limited because 
“[a] failure to successfully register does not disturb existing state or federal 
[common law] rights in a [trade]mark.”20  The fact that a federal law remedy 
exists for a common-law trademark supports the pyramid model and the idea 
that common-law trademarks and federal trademarks are intertwined.  
However, in contrast, the fact that there is the ability to choose between state 
 
15. Id. at 659–60. 
16. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3. 
17. Hyman et al., supra note 7, at 659. 
18. About Trademark Infringement, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-
infringement [https://perma.cc/3LKD-A4ZZ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
19. Trademark Infringement, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark_infringement [https://perma.cc/7Y3Q-LYD2] (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
20. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 19:3. 
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law and federal law supports the box model and the idea that common-law 
trademarks and federal trademarks are separate and distinct. 
II.  THE CONVERSE, INC. V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION DECISION 
Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission is a recent example of 
the conflict between the pyramid model and the box model.  The ITC decided 
that trademarks and trademark rights follow the box model.21  However, the 
Federal Circuit decided that trademarks and trademark rights follow the 
pyramid model.22 
A.  Converse and the International Trade Commission 
It all started with a trademark: U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4,398,753 
(“Converse’s federal trademark”).23  Converse’s federal trademark was issued 
on September 10, 2013.24 
 
[Converse’s federal trademark] . . . describes the trade-dress 
configuration of three design elements on the midsole of Converse’s 
[Chuck Taylor] All Star shoes.  In particular, as described in the 
registration, ‘[Converse’s federal] [trade]mark consists of the design of 
the two stripes on the midsole of the shoe, the design of toe cap, the 
design of the multi-layered toe bumper featuring diamonds and line 
patterns, and the relative position of these elements to each other.’25 
Converse’s federal trademark is depicted below.26 
 
 
21. See Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
22. See id. at 1115. 
23. Id. at 1113. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 1113–14. 
26. Id. at 1114. 
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Fast forward approximately one year to the starting point of “one of the 
most hotly-litigated trademark cases ever.”27  On October 14, 2014, Converse 
filed a lawsuit with the ITC.28  In its complaint, Converse “alleg[ed] violations 
of section 337 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] by various respondents in the 
importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within 
the United States after importation of shoes that infringe on its trademark.”29 
The ITC initiated an investigation on November 17, 2014.30  Even though 
some of the respondents defaulted, several other respondents that Converse 
named in its complaint (the “intervenors”) “appeared and actively participated 
in the ITC proceedings, asserting that the accused products did not infringe . . . 
[Converse’s federal trademark] and that, in any event, [Converse’s federal 
trademark] was invalid.”31 
One of the critical issues contested by the parties was whether Converse’s 
federal trademark had acquired secondary meaning.32  Converse argued that 
Converse had used the three design elements in Converse’s federal trademark 
since 1932, and therefore, Converse had established secondary meaning.33  
However, the intervenors argued that Converse had not established secondary 
meaning because the use of Converse’s federal trademark had not been 
“substantially exclusive.”34  Moreover, to further support their argument that 
 
27. Converse Scores a Win in “One of the Most Hotly-Litigated Trademark Cases Ever,” THE 
FASHION LAW (Oct. 30, 2018), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/in-front-of-the-federal-circuit-
converse-scores-a-win-in-highly-watched-chuck-taylor-case [https://perma.cc/8PT2-YPD4]. 
28. Converse, 909 F.3d at 1114. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
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Converse’s federal trademark lacked secondary meaning, the intervenors 
offered the Butler survey to show that consumers did not associate Converse’s 
federal trademark with a single source.35  Converse and the intervenors also 
disputed trademark infringement.36  The ITC and the ITC Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) “treated Converse as claiming two separate [trade]marks[:] a 
common-law [trade]mark and a [federal] [trade]mark.”37  Thus, the ITC and 
ITC ALJ decided to go with the box model. 
The ITC ALJ issued an initial determination on November 17, 2015.38  The 
ITC ALJ “[found] violations of section 337 by the intervenors because . . . 
[Converse’s federal] trademark was infringed and not invalid, relying on the 
presumption of secondary meaning afforded to . . . [Converse’s federal] 
[trade]mark.”39  The ITC ALJ determined that Converse’s common-law 
trademark had not acquired secondary meaning, “[]but that, if protectable, the 
common-law [trade]mark was infringed[].”40 
Converse, the intervenors, and the ITC staff petitioned to have the initial 
determination reviewed.41  The ITC issued a final determination on June 23, 
2016.42  The ITC made determinations for both Converse’s common-law 
trademark and Converse’s federal trademark.43  First, for Converse’s common-
law trademark, “the ITC affirmed the [ITC] ALJ’s finding that . . . [Converse’s 
common-law] [trade]mark had not acquired secondary meaning.”44  Second, 
for Converse’s federal trademark, “[t]he ITC reversed the [ITC] ALJ’s finding 
of no invalidity . . . .  The ITC found . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark 
invalid in light of its determination that . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark 
had not acquired secondary meaning.”45  Furthermore, “[t]he ITC determined 
that, if either trademark was not invalid or protectable, it was infringed, 
affirming the [ITC] ALJ’s finding in this respect.”46 
The ITC did not enter an exclusion order in regard to the intervenors or any 
of the other respondents.47  Converse appealed to the Federal Circuit.48  
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1114–15. 
44. Id. at 1115. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission ensued. 
B.  Converse and the Federal Circuit 
On October 30, 2018, the Federal Circuit determined the fate of Converse’s 
common-law trademark and federal trademark in Converse, Inc. v. 
International Trade Commission.49  A divided Federal Circuit “conclude[d] that 
the ITC made a series of errors that require[d] a remand.”50  The Federal Circuit 
separated its opinion into three parts to address these errors.51  In Part I, the 
Federal Circuit “discuss[ed] the relevant date for assessing secondary meaning, 
the significance of Converse’s trademark registration, and the benefits arising 
from that registration.”52  In Part II, the Federal Circuit “define[d] the factors to 
be weighed in determining whether a [trade]mark has acquired secondary 
meaning.”53  In Part III, the Federal Circuit “address[ed] the standard for 
evaluating likelihood of confusion for the purposes of determining [trademark] 
infringement.”54 
In Part I, the Federal Circuit began by stating that “it is confusing and 
inaccurate to refer to two separate [trade]marks[:] a [federal] [trade]mark and a 
common-law [trade]mark.”55  According to the Federal Circuit, trademarks and 
trademark rights are characterized according to the pyramid model because 
“[Converse has] a single [trade]mark, as to which different rights attach from 
the common law and from federal registration.”56  The Federal Circuit provided 
four citations to support its proposition that Converse possessed only one 
trademark: (1) In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.,57 (2) In re 
Deister Concentrator Co.,58 (3) McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition,59 and (4) Matal v. Tam.60  The Federal Circuit did some simple 
math: Converse’s common-law trademark plus Converse’s federal trademark 
equals Converse’s trademark.61   
With this crucial determination out of the way, the Federal Circuit next 
 
49. Converse Scores a Win in “One of the Most Hotly–Litigated Trademark Cases Ever,” supra 
note 27. 
50. Converse, 909 F.3d at 1115. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1115–16. 
59. Id. at 1116. 
60. Id. 
61. See generally id. at 1115. 
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outlined the prima facie case for trademark infringement, and it explained two 
ways in which a trademark can be distinctive.62  The Federal Circuit stated that 
since Converse was attempting to protect product design, it must show that its 
trademark had acquired secondary meaning.63  However, “[t]he ITC’s decision 
never determined the relevant date for assessing the existence of secondary 
meaning.”64  The Federal Circuit proceeded to analyze the appropriate date for 
determining secondary meaning.65 
In Part I, the Federal Circuit concluded that “Converse’s registration 
confer[red] a presumption of secondary meaning beginning only as of the date 
of registration and confer[red] no presumption of secondary meaning before the 
date of registration.”66  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that “with respect to 
infringement by those respondents whose first uses came before the registration 
(including all of the intervenors), Converse must establish[,] without the benefit 
of the presumption[,] that its [trade]mark had acquired secondary meaning 
before the first infringing use by each respondent.”67  The Federal Circuit 
directed the ITC to use this correct, relevant date on remand.68 
While the ITC weighed seven factors for determining whether Converse’s 
federal trademark acquired secondary meaning, in Part II of the opinion, the 
Federal Circuit determined that only six factors were necessary for the 
secondary meaning assessment.69  For the Federal Circuit’s secondary meaning 
test, the factors to consider include: 
(1) association of the trade dress with a particular source by actual 
purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys); (2) length, 
degree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; 
(4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) intentional copying; 
and (6) unsolicited media coverage of the product embodying the 
[trade]mark.70 
Further, after outlining the appropriate secondary meaning test, the Federal 
Circuit delved into a discussion of the particularities of some of the factors.71  
 
62. Id. at 1116. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1116–17. 
66. Id. at 1118. 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 1119. 
69. Id. at 1119–20. 
70. Id. at 1120. 
71. Id. at 1120–23. 
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The Federal Circuit instructed the ITC to use the six-factor test on remand.72 
Finally, in Part III of the opinion, the Federal Circuit outlined the 
appropriate likelihood-of-confusion analysis for trademark infringement.73  The 
Federal Circuit directed the ITC to “determine whether [the accused products] 
are substantially similar to [Converse’s] [trade]mark” when it undertakes the 
trademark infringement analysis on remand.74 
While the pyramid model prevailed in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission, the box model does not go ignored.  The box model has its day in 
court with Judge O’Malley’s concurrence in part and dissent in part.75  Judge 
O’Malley cited four reasons to support her opinion “that the majority was 
correct in vacating the ITC’s decision but that it had addressed issues not 
properly before it, with respect to the validity and infringement analyses.”76 
Specifically, [Judge O’Malley] believe[d] that the majority: (1) 
misperceive[d] the scope of the ITC’s authority to invalidate duly 
issued intellectual property rights when it addresses the issue of the 
validity of a [federal] [trade]mark; (2) blur[red] the line between the 
concepts of priority of use under common law and the validity of a 
[federal] [trade]mark; (3) espouse[d] advisory—and unnecessary—
opinions on the weight to be given certain survey evidence and the 
question of infringement; and (4) ignore[d] the ITC’s statutory 
obligation to enter remedies against defaulting parties.77 
Judge O’Malley’s second point is most relevant to this Comment.  
According to Judge O’Malley, “the relevant and only question” before the court 
involved Converse’s common-law trademark.78  “[T]he majority goes on to 
assess the validity of . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark even though no 
respondents remain for whom . . . [Converse’s federal] [trade]mark is 
relevant.”79  It appears that Judge O’Malley supported the use of the box model 
and believed, as the ITC did, that Converse possessed two separate trademarks. 
Both trademark models make an appearance in the Converse, Inc. v. 
International Trade Commission opinion, but the question remains: did the 
Federal Circuit select the correct trademark model? 
 
72. See id. 
73. Id. at 1124. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. at 1127. 
76. Trademark/Trade Dress Infringement, 31 NO. 3 BUS. TORTS REP. 66 (2019). 
77. Converse, 909 F.3d at 1127–28. 
78. Id. at 1131. 
79. Id. 
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III.  TRADEMARK DECISIONS COMPARISON 
 
The Federal Circuit, in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 
touched on important aspects of trademark law and provided crucial 
clarifications.  Most importantly, the Federal Circuit determined that 
trademarks and trademark rights follow the pyramid model rather than the box 
model.  The substantive portions of the Converse, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission opinion turned on the Federal Circuit’s determination that 
trademarks and trademark rights function under the pyramid model.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court supports the Federal Circuit’s use of the 
pyramid model.  In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. and Matal v. 
Tam, two cases cited in the Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission 
opinion, are examples of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court applying 
and upholding the pyramid model.  For both cases, background and procedural 
history are provided for context.  The relevant portions of the opinions that are 
cited by the Federal Circuit in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission are then outlined. 
A. Federal Circuit Case: In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. 
International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”) manufactured and 
marketed flavor and fragrance essences for a variety of uses.80  In 1994, IFF 
filed three trademark applications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(the “USPTO”) for “LIVING XXXX FLAVORS,”81 “LIVING XXXX 
FLAVOR,”82 and “LIVING XXXX.”83  The XXXX served as a placeholder for 
specific herbs,84 fruits,85 plants,86 vegetables,87 botanicals,88 and botanical 
extracts.89 
The registrations for the trademarks were initially rejected by the 
examining attorney “because the specimens did not match the [trade]marks 
depicted in the specimens, i.e., the specimens did not have an ‘XXXX’ 
 
80. In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
81. Id. at 1363. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1364. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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element.”90  IFF “entered disclaimers for the terms ‘FLAVOR’ and 
‘FLAVORS’ and amended the applications to add that ‘the “XXXX” 
designations are themselves not part of the [trade]mark.’”91  However, a final 
rejection was issued, and the registration for the trademarks was denied.92 
IFF appealed to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (the “TTAB”).93  In its opinion, the key issue, as identified by 
the TTAB, was that IFF was attempting “to protect, in three registrations[,] . . . 
an unknown number of [trade]marks.”94  “The [TTAB] concluded that anyone 
conducting a search of IFF’s phantom [trade]mark would be unable to 
determine the entire scope covered by such [trade]marks and would be unable 
to ascertain the designation used to identify and distinguish the goods covered 
by the [trade]mark.”95  The TTAB agreed with the examining attorney’s initial 
determination and “affirmed . . . [the] final rejection of [the trademark 
registration] applications.”96  IFF appealed the TTAB’s decision to the Federal 
Circuit.97  The Federal Circuit upheld the TTAB’s decision.98 
In addition to identifying that a trademark application may only be used to 
register for one trademark, the Federal Circuit explained the relationship 
between common-law trademarks and federal trademarks.99  First, the Federal 
Circuit noted that “[t]he federal registration of a trademark does not create an 
exclusive property right in the [trade]mark.”100  “The owner of the [trade]mark 
already has the property right established by prior use.”101  Trademarks 
“identif[y] and distinguish[] the owner’s goods from others.  It also signifies 
the source and quality of the goods.  These attributes are not established or 
granted by federal registration of the [trade]mark.”102  A trademark owner 
“need not register his or her [trade]mark in accordance with the Lanham Act in 
order to use the [trade]mark in connection with goods or to seek to prevent 
others from using the [trade]mark.”103  “However, those trademark owners who 
register their [trade]marks with the [USPTO] are afforded additional protection 
 
90. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1364–65. 
96. Id. at 1365. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1368. 
99. Id. at 1366. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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not provided by the common law.”104 
The Federal Circuit continued its opinion by outlining the benefits of 
federal registration.  The Federal Circuit noted that the purpose of 
implementing a federal trademark registration scheme was to build upon 
common law rights.105 
 
[T]he Lanham Act provides a federal[] . . . trademark owner a 
forum in federal court in which to adjudicate infringement 
claims, . . . and it allows, in certain cases, a registrant whose 
[trade]mark has been infringed to seek costs, treble damages, 
[and] attorney fees . . . ; the destruction of infringing articles 
. . . ; and the ability to prevent the importation of infringing 
goods . . . .106 
 
Federal registration serves the interests of the registrants, other participants 
in the market place such as entrepreneurs, and consumers.107  “Federal 
registration provides a useful means for the public to provide enhanced legal 
protections to a common law property right in exchange for protection of the 
public against palming off and misrepresentation in the market place.”108  Based 
on the reasoning included in the opinion, it is clear that the Federal Circuit 
relied on the pyramid model rather than the box model. 
B.  Supreme Court Decision: Matal v. Tam 
In Matal v. Tam, Simon Tam, lead singer of The Slants, sought to register 
the band’s name under federal trademark law.109  The USPTO denied the 
application based on a provision in the Lanham Act “prohibiting the registration 
of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute’ 
any ‘persons, living or dead.’”110  “Tam contested the denial of registration 
through the administrative appeals process, to no avail.  He then took the case 
to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the 
disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause.”111  The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Circuit’s 
 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1366–67. 
107. Id. at 1367. 
108. Id. at 1368. 
109. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017). 
110. Id. at 1751. 
111. Id. at 1747. 
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determination.112 
Before delving into the merits of the denied application, the Supreme Court 
discussed the fundamentals of trademarks, including a comparison between 
common-law trademarks and federal trademarks.113  To begin, the Supreme 
Court stated that “[f]ederal law does not create trademarks.”114  “Trademarks 
and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at 
common law and in equity at the time of the founding of [the United States].”115  
Trademark law became the purview of the federal government with the passage 
of the Lanham Act in 1946.116  “This system of federal registration [as outlined 
in the Lanham Act] helps to ensure that trademarks are fully protected and 
supports the free flow of commerce.”117  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that “[n]ational protection of trademarks is desirable . . . because 
trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to 
the producer the benefits of good reputation.”118 
Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that valid trademarks do not 
require federal registration to be used in commerce.119  In addition to the 
protection of state trademark law, common-law trademarks fall under the 
purview of federal trademark law in two important instances.120  First, “even if 
a trademark is not federally registered, it may still be enforceable under § 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, which creates a federal cause of action for trademark 
infringement.”121  Second, “[common-law] trademarks may also be entitled to 
protection under other federal statutes, such as the Anticybersquautting 
Consumer Protection Act . . . .”122  The Supreme Court also discussed the 
protection of common-law trademarks at the state level.123  The Supreme Court 
recognized that federal registration builds upon the foundation established by 
common law rights, stating that “[f]ederal registration . . . ‘confers important 
legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their 
 
112. Id. at 1751. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. (quoting B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1752. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. (quoting San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522, 531 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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[trade]marks.’”124  Based on the reasoning included in the opinion, the Supreme 
Court was clearly advocating for the pyramid model rather than the box model. 
C.  But What About the Box Model? 
In Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit 
provides a snapshot of the trademark cases that follow the pyramid model, 
briefly discussing four citations to other sources of authority,125 to support its 
decision to apply the pyramid model.  The Federal Circuit only scratches the 
surface; there are many more trademark law cases that discuss the pyramid 
model.  However, there does not appear to be any Federal Circuit or Supreme 
Court majority opinions that rely on the box model.  This lack of support for 
the box model bolsters the argument that the Federal Circuit got it right in 
Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission. 
IV.  PRAISE FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
The Federal Circuit correctly selected the pyramid model.  The ITC errored 
in applying the box model to distinguish Converse’s common-law trademark 
from Converse’s federal trademark.  Converse does not have a common-law 
trademark and a federal trademark.  Rather, Converse has a single trademark 
that has common law rights and federal registration rights.  Converse has a main 
trademark with a common law trademark portion and a federal trademark 
portion.  Converse has a pyramid with two levels.  Common law rights and 
federal registration rights build upon one another.  Federal registration rights 
support common law rights by providing additional safeguards; federal 
registration rights do not supplant common law rights. 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit maintained an important trademark tradition 
and precedent with its decision in Converse, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission.  Even though the field of trademarks continuously evolves, the 
underlying principles do not.  The pyramid model is a better representation of 
these underlying principles than the box model.  It is unclear as to why the ITC 
decided to apply the box model because the ITC ALJ did not provide any 
support for that determination.  The ITC ALJ stated that the box model applied 
and moved on with the rest of the analysis without further reasoning.  
Regardless of the lack of reasoning by the ITC ALJ, the Federal Circuit 
recognized the error and quickly corrected course.  Furthermore, it is important 
to recognize that cases prior to Converse, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission maintained the same foundational aspects of trademark law by 
applying the pyramid model.  If there were an issue with viewing trademarks 
 
124. Id. at 1753. 
125. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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and trademark rights under the pyramid model, there would be a discrepancy 
between Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission and prior case law.  
However, there is no discrepancy here. 
It is not contrary to the fundamental principles of trademark law to think of 
trademarks and trademark rights as a pyramid.  The essence of trademarks is 
interdependence.  The product relies on the trademark as a source of 
identification.  The product relies on the use of the trademark in commerce to 
attach common law rights.  The consumer relies on the trademark as a way to 
distinguish one product from another.  Federal registration rights rely on 
common law rights.  Therefore, it makes sense that there is a single trademark.  
Trademark rights exist as a pyramid with federal registration rights building 
upon common law rights.  The pyramid model is the way to go. 
CONCLUSION 
In Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit 
provided further clarification on the issue of whether common-law trademarks 
are distinguishable from federal trademarks.  The Federal Circuit correctly 
answered this question by applying the pyramid model.  Trademarks should be 
viewed under the context of the pyramid model.  A trademark constitutes one 
pyramid, composed of two levels that define the sub-trademarks and associated 
rights.  Level 1 contains the common-law trademark portion and common law 
rights, and Level 2 houses the federal trademark portion and federal registration 
rights.  This crucial determination—that trademarks and trademark rights work 
like a pyramid—impacted the remaining portions of the Converse, Inc. v. 
International Trade Commission opinion.  Although the Federal Circuit did not 
devote many words to the determination that the pyramid model applies, the 
importance of viewing trademark law under the pyramid model cannot be 
underscored.  It is clear that the Federal Circuit took one out of Converse’s 
playbook: do not mess with a classic.  Just as the Converse All-Star shoe is a 
classic in the universe of consumer goods, fundamental trademark principles 
and the pyramid model are classics in the universe of intellectual property law. 
 
